Submission ID 118479
| Issue/Objective | Clustered Regularly Interspaced Palindromic Repeats, commonly known as CRISPR/Cas9 , is a revolutionary "gene-editing technology" that allows the removal or replacement of existing genomes from specific parts of DNA . While gene editing has been possible for several decades now, CRISPR is unique as it allows the correction of genes "quickly, cheaply, and with relative ease." By drastically bringing down the cost and increasing the precision of genetic editing, CRISPR's invention in 2012 emerged as a ray of hope for scientists, doctors, and families that have been on a long search for a solution for genetic disorders like Huntingtins disease, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, or cystic fibrosis. Alongside the celebration of this ground-breaking technology, some experts have been concerned about how the ease with which genetic editing is possible with CRISPR could lead to catastrophic implications, ethically, socially, and physically. Unlike its predecessors like Zinc Finger Nucleases and Transcription Activator-Like Effector Nucleases, gene editing through CRISPR was different as its use was not restricted to laboratories or academic settings but could be achieved by the "do it yourself" or "DIY" community of "amateur scientists." In fact, the scientists who won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for discovering the genetic editing technique themselves have drawn analogies between nuclear weapons and CRISPR , highlighting the prospectively catastrophic use of the 'genetic scissors.' In their book, Jennifer Doudna and Samuel Sternberg raise a critical point on the urgency of establishing an international consensus on the novel technology. They emphasize the need to "save CRISPR from itself." More importantly, they say that the international community must achieve this before a "cataclysm" occurs, thereby avoiding the reiteration of the historical series of events that resulted in the international regulation of nuclear weapons. This is the argument I seek to expand on in this paper. I intend to highlight the timeliness of international discussions on establishing a global consensus on the need to limit research and development on CRISPR that can be used to make a bioweapon. While several experts remain skeptical about the threat from the use of this technology to cause imminent widespread death or devastation, I posit that this line of argument alone does not refute the need for international discussions on the issue. Instead, I argue that the international community must anticipate and keep up with the scientific prowess to ensure that it is not forced to make a reactionary policy after the technology's use is already widespread and, therefore, difficult to restrict and contain. |
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| Methodology/Approach | To begin with, I will review the international legal instruments that government genetic editing, bioweapon development, and other such agreements between countries. Moreover, I will be conducting a literature review on the ethical and scientific debate surrounding the harms of genetic editing. First, I will look into the arguments made by commentators that posit that the threat of a CRISPR bioweapon is not imminent, given the technological and logistical barriers to such an invention. Second, I will analyse counterarguments made by commentators, highlighting the prospectively catastrophic use of the technology. Third, I will present evidence to show that governments have already begun taking a military interest in gene editing, making the threat of a CRISPR catastrophe not only real but also growing in imminence. |
| Results | First, I will establish the threat of a CRISPR bioweapon by looking into arguments both for and against the imminence of a threat from such a scientific development. To this end, I will argue that even if the progress on the weapon's development is not at an advanced state, the need for international discussions on this issue is imminent given the ease and pace at which the science for such a bioweapon can develop. Second, I will present the existing international legal framework surrounding bioweapons, including the Biological Weapons Convention, and its inability to deal with the novel challenges CRISPR poses. Through this section, I aim to highlight that the current lacunae in the law have left countries to establish their own framework on the matter. I argue that this model is not successfully dealing with the threat, thereby highlighting the need for an international consensus on the issue. Third, I present the key priorities that should guide these discussions, along with the challenges they must prepare to mitigate. |
| Discussion/Conclusion | The international regulatory gap combined with CRISPR's ease of access threatens to make the prospect of a gene-editing bioweapon real. To this end, I argue that there should be a global effort to establish a robust international legal structure to limit dangerous research while simultaneously promoting the exploration of the positive potential uses of gene editing. To achieve this, a dual approach is recommended to start the ball rolling on governing a CRISPR bioweapon. On the one hand, there is a need to secure a large, multilateral consensus establishing the acceptable boundaries of research on a CRISPR bioweapon, relying on established human rights principles that are already integrated into national laws. This would guide national approaches, while simultaneously asserting the potential dangers of such a weapon. On the other hand, there should be efforts to incentivize a two-way collaboration between science and policy to ensure compliance with socially acceptable practices. |
| Presenters and affiliations | Erica Sharma University of Toronto Erica Sharma University of Toronto |
